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Better Incentives Data Can
Inform Both Research and Policy
Timothy J. Bartik
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Incentives tripled from 1990
to 2015, increasing from 9
percent of state/local business
taxes to 30 percent.
n Incentives often vary
by a factor of 2 or 3 to 1
across nearby states, for no
clear economic reason and
with no obvious economic
consequences.
n States underinvest
in customized business
services and overinvest
in tax incentives for
low-wage businesses and
long-term incentives.
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In March 2017 the Upjohn Institute released
a new, publicly accessible database on economic
development incentives, which are those offered
by state and local governments as their “usual
deal” to entice a business to locate a new facility.
(The database is housed on the Upjohn Institute’s
website: www.upjohn.org/models/bied/home.php.)
These incentives include property tax abatements,
job creation tax credits, investment tax credits, and
R&D tax credits. They also include customized
job training programs, under which community
colleges provide a new facility with training for new
workers that is customized to the facility’s needs.
No other study of incentives is as comprehensive
in covering diverse industries and lengthy time
periods. Using data from 1990 to 2015, the “Panel
Database on Incentives and Taxes” estimates
marginal business taxes and business incentives for
45 industries in 33 states; the industries compose 91
percent of U.S. labor compensation, and the states
produce over 92 percent of U.S. economic output.
The database has data for a new facility starting
up in each of 26 “start years.” Compared to prior
studies, the new database provides more incentive
details, such as how incentives are broken down
by different incentive types (e.g., job creation tax
credits vs. property tax abatements), and the time
pattern by which incentives are paid out over a
facility’s life cycle.
The purpose of this new database is to help
researchers and policymakers learn more about
incentives and their effectiveness. Without
knowing how different incentives vary over time
and across industries for different states, it is
impossible to conduct any meaningful incentives
research or to subject incentives to any informed
public debate. Do incentive differences across
states, industries, or time lead to any significant
effects on an industry’s growth in a state? Do
incentives allocate more U.S. growth to needier
areas or to industries that might boost national

productivity? Without incentives data, such
questions cannot begin to be addressed.
In addition to being downloadable, the database
is analyzed in an accompanying report (Bartik
2017) that focuses on 31 “export-base” industries,
which are those that sell their goods and services
outside the state but not necessarily outside the
country. Such industries provide the base for a

The typical state does little industry
targeting—for example, higherwage industries do not receive
significantly higher incentives.
state’s economy by bringing new money into the
state. This article highlights the main findings in
the report.
Incentives are Large Compared to State and
Local Business Taxes but Modest as a Share of
Overall Costs
Incentives for the average state’s base industries
in 2015 offset around 30 percent of what otherwise
would be charged in state and local business taxes.
Incentives play a significant role in state and local
taxes and budgets.
On the other hand, incentives for base
industries average about 1.4 percent of business
value-added, a measure of the value of the
business’s production. (Business value-added
is defined as the business’s sales minus what it
purchases from other businesses.) Incentives can
be offset by modest variations in other business
costs, such as wages.
Incentives Tripled from 1990 to 2015
Average incentives increased from 9 percent of
business taxes in 1990 to 30 percent in 2015. As
shown in Figure 1, this increase was most rapid
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in the 1990s. In the past decade, some
states have significantly expanded
incentives while other states have made
cuts.
Incentives Vary Greatly across
Nearby States, with No Obvious
Strong Correlation with a State’s
Economic Past or Future
As shown in Figure 2, incentives
often vary by a factor of 2 to 1 or
more across nearby states. These
incentive differences are not tied to a
state’s unemployment, so incentives
are not reallocating jobs to high
unemployment areas.
Incentive differences do not appear
to have large effects on state economic
growth by industry. The database
suggests incentive effects toward the
low end of prior estimates: the average
incentive package, 1.4 percent of valueadded, might tip the location decision
of 6 percent of incented businesses—
the other 94 percent of the time, the

state would have experienced similar
growth without the incentive.
This typical 6 percent tip rate of
incentives is a low batting average.
To have benefits greater than costs,
incentives must do something special—
they either need unusually high
benefits per job created, or incentive
designs must exceed the typical batting
average, lowering costs per job created.
Higher benefits per incented job
can be achieved if incentives target
high-wage or high-tech industries.
High-wage industries obviously are
good for those industries’ workers. In
addition, because higher-wage workers
have more income to spend at local
retailers, such industries will have
higher multiplier effects in creating
other local jobs. Because high-tech
industries tend to cluster, incented
high-tech jobs might also have higher
multipliers, with each induced hightech job creating five other local jobs
(Moretti 2010).

Figure 1 Incentives as a Percent of Business Taxes, 1990–2015

35
30
U

25
20
15
10
5
0
1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

NOTE: Chart shows the average magnitude of state and local business incentives as a percent of state and local
business taxes, 1990–2015.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Incentives Vary Little
across Industries
Even though some industries offer
much greater benefits, the typical
state does little industry targeting.
As shown in Figure 3, higher-wage
industries do not receive significantly
higher incentives. Incentives do not
particularly target high-tech, as each
extra 10 percent of industry R&D
spending only increases incentives by
0.3 percent.
Incentives are Excessively Long Term
Incentives are more effective if they
are more up front. Because business
executives tend to think in the short
term, an incentive today is more
effective at inducing location decisions
than an incentive that is only paid out
10 years from now. The average state
has incentives that are still 1.1 percent
of business value-added when a
facility is in its tenth year of operation.
Reducing such long-term incentives
would lower long-term government
costs of incentives without having
much effect on job creation.
States Underinvest in Customized
Business Services
Incentives designed as customized
services may be more effective than tax
incentives. For example, customized
job training is a very effective incentive.
Research suggests that, per dollar,
customized job training might be 10
times more effective than tax incentives
in encouraging local business growth
(Hollenbeck [2008]; Hoyt, Jepsen, and
Troske [2008]; see also Holzer et al.
[1993]). Other effective customized
services include manufacturing
extension programs, which have been
shown to improve productivity (Jarmin
1998).
Why are such customized services
more cost-effective? They tend to be
more targeted than tax incentives at
small and medium-sized businesses,
whose location and expansion behavior
is easier to affect than large businesses’.
Because obtaining quality job training
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Summary
While these conclusions are based
on preliminary analysis of the “Panel
Database on Incentives and Taxes,”
the database allows for much more
extensive examinations of different
types of incentives for each state for
diverse industries. Such detailed
analyses can play an important role
in the growing national movement
toward subjecting incentives to
greater transparency, evaluation, and
accountability. According to the Pew
Charitable Trusts (2016), “Since 2012,
22 states and the District of Columbia
have enacted laws requiring regular,
rigorous, independent evaluation of tax
incentives.” In addition, in 2015, the
Governmental Accounting Standards
Board adopted a new reporting
standard, GASB 77, under which state
and local governments that comply
with “generally accepted accounting
principles” must annually report at least
the aggregate revenue foregone from
each tax incentive program (Good Jobs
First 2015). The database complements
GASB 77 reports by providing more
long-term and industry-detailed
information on incentives. It supports
state incentive evaluations by
facilitating comparisons across states,
industries, and incentive types. With
better data and evaluation of incentives,
state and local governments over time
can reform such incentives to increase
their benefits for state residents relative
to costs.

Figure 2 Incentives across Nearby States as a Percent of Value-Added, 2015
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NOTE: Chart shows state and local business incentives as a percent of business value-added across three pairs
of adjacent states as of 2015.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

Figure 3 Comparison of Incentives vs. Wages across Industries, as of 2015
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services or business advice may be
difficult for smaller businesses to
do on their own, the value of such
services may exceed their costs. Finally,
customized services provide up-front
assistance, helping the business be
more productive immediately.
However, despite the greater costeffectiveness of customized services,
state and local incentives are more
focused on tax incentives. For example,
the typical state only spends $1 on
customized job training for every $20
devoted to tax incentives.
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NOTE: Each dot represents 1 of 31 export-base industries. The vertical axis shows the national average for state
and local business incentives for that industry, as a percent of that industry’s value-added. The horizontal
axis shows the industry’s average wages per full-time equivalent worker.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Working Longer,
Retiring Later
Are Employers Ready for the New Employment Trend?
Robert L. Clark and Melinda Sandler Morrill
Policy analysts, economists, and
demographers argue that individuals
must extend their work lives if they
are to achieve their desired standards
of living in retirement. Increases in
longevity imply that those who leave
the labor force at traditional retirement
ages must either save more during
their working careers or consume less
during their retirement.
The logic behind later retirement
from the employee’s perspective is
clear and has been studied in detail:
remaining in the labor force for
additional years is needed to support
increasing years in retirement.
However, relatively few studies have
directly addressed how employers
feel about having workers remain on
the job until older ages. Our book,
Extending Work Life: Can Employers
Adapt When Employees Want to Delay
Retirement?, which was recently
published by the Upjohn Institute
(see p. 7), seeks to fill this gap by
providing a comprehensive assessment
of the costs and benefits to employers
of accommodating later retirement
ages. Through their employment and
compensation policies, employers can
either assist or restrict workers’ ability
to remain on the job.
Economic theory of the firm
indicates that companies determine
the optimal number of workers to

hire and the appropriate age and skill
composition of their workforces. A
firm will need a mix of employees of
different skill types, skill levels, and
vintages of human capital. Changes in
the age structure of a firm’s workforce
due to delayed retirement can affect
labor costs, productivity, profitability,
and sustainability. Companies develop
their compensation policies to attract,
retain, motivate, and ultimately retire
their desired workforces. As a result,
shifts in worker preferences may lead
to changes in company policies.
Employers must consider the
advantages and costs of retaining
or hiring older workers. Older
workers often are relatively highly
compensated, and some will experience
diminished productivity at older ages.
Furthermore, as employers retain
older workers, the opportunities for
advancement by younger workers
might be restricted. Employers must
address the changing demographics
in their workforces. By creating
compensation and employment
policies to accommodate prolonged
or delayed retirement transitions,
employers will be better positioned to
reap the benefits of employing older
workers.
What factors influence a firm’s
willingness to retain older workers?
Can companies develop transitional

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Between 1994 and 2014, the labor force participation rate for men aged 65–69 rose
from 27 to 36 percent.
n By creating compensation and employment policies to accommodate prolonged or
delayed retirement transitions, employers will be better positioned to reap the benefits
of employing older workers.
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employment contracts so workers can
shift to new areas, perhaps with less
responsibility and lower compensation,
while remaining with their career
employers? While exploring the
bottlenecks and constraints that
might inhibit the development of
delayed retirement policies, our
book provides new insights into how
retirement transitions might develop
in the coming years and the potential
implications for legislative and
employer policies regarding retirement
ages.
Changing Patterns of Retirement
Throughout most of the twentieth
century, labor force participation
rates of older individuals steadily
declined as real income increased.
The establishment of Social Security
in 1935 promised workers a base
income in retirement. In the post–
World War II period, employers began
offering pension plans that provided
additional retirement income. As these
plans gained popularity, employers
developed pensions that provided
significant incentives for workers to
retire at or before age 65. Employers
encouraging retirement at relatively
young ages was the result of a rapidly
growing population that enabled firms
to hire younger workers at lower wages.
Increases in educational attainment
and the emergence of new technologies
reduced the competitive advantage of
experience. Thus, changing economic
and demographic conditions provided
the impetus for employers to develop
employment and compensation
policies that encouraged retirement at
specific ages.
In the past twenty-five years, there
have been substantial changes in the
proportion of older persons in the
labor force. As Figure 1 shows, between
1994 and 2014 the largest changes
for men have been for individuals
aged 62 and older. The labor force
participation rate for men aged
62–64 increased from 45 to 56 percent
during this period, while the rate for
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men aged 65–69 rose from 27 to 36
percent. Participation rates for women
followed a similar pattern; however,
the increases were greater for younger
women. The proportion of women aged
55–59 who were in the labor force rose
from 59 to 66 percent, and the rate for
women aged 60–61 increased from 45
to 58 percent. These trends in increased
labor force participation are projected
to continue. That, combined with the
aging of the population, has resulted in
a more than doubling of the number of
workers aged 55 and older, from 15.5
million in 1994 to 33.9 million in 2014.
As workers seek to delay retirement,
firms must review their policies and
determine whether and how they will
accommodate later retirement.
Employer Concerns about
Delayed Retirement
The most important issue for
employers associated with delayed
retirement is the impact of an aging
labor force on productivity and labor
costs. Many employers believe that
at some point productivity begins

to decline. At the same time, wages
and salaries typically rise with years
on the job. The cost of employee
benefits—especially health insurance,
pension contributions, and paid time
off—also increases with age. Economic
theory indicates that when a worker’s
marginal productivity falls below the

Through their employment and
compensation policies, employers
can either assist or restrict workers’
ability to remain on the job.
marginal cost to the firm, then a firm
has an economic rationale to want this
employee to retire.
Pay scales and benefits help firms
attract the desired labor force and then
retain them. Companies also develop
policies to incentivize employees
to retire when it is optimal for the
employer. If workers do not retire
around these ages, the company will
be adversely affected. Thus, many
employers will resist later retirement

Figure 1 Labor Force Participation Rates for Men and Women Aged 55 and Older (%)
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because they believe it will lower
productivity, raise costs, and alter
the optimal age distribution of their
workforce.
Employer Policies for the Future
Assuming that employees will
continue to desire later retirement,
employers must decide how they will

Many employers will resist later
retirement because they believe
it will lower productivity, raise
costs, and alter the optimal age
distribution of their workforce.
respond. They may seek to develop
new compensation and employment
policies. They might find that, all else
equal, it is optimal to accommodate
workers’ preferences for working
longer by modifying job assignments
and compensation policies. However,
employers may also face barriers
when making adjustments to working
conditions and/or compensation, such
as union contracts, age discrimination
laws, tax law and pension regulations,
and production techniques.
In some settings, phased retirement
and return-to-work policies might
make sense to both employees and
employers. Many workers may prefer
restructured compensation while
remaining with their current employers
rather than retiring and seeking new
employment in a bridge job. Despite
this, the use of these policies in today’s
workforces is somewhat limited.
Employers may have informal policies
with the aim of keeping the best
workers but may be reluctant to have
a broad program that offers phased
retirement to all qualified employees.
Employers might also be reluctant to
adopt such policies for fear that they
might run afoul of federal and state age
discrimination policies.
It seems likely that firms will face
increasing demand from employees

6

to delay retirement. New research is
needed to provide a better framework
in which to evaluate the impact of
this expected change on labor costs
and productivity. For example, would
individuals actually prefer a decreasing
wage profile at the end of a career prior
to complete retirement? Would this
type of contract be more appealing
if framed as a lifetime compensation
package rather than a decline in salary
at the end of career? The presence of
bridge jobs suggests that lower wages
and fewer hours are appealing to some
older workers.
In the longer term, if employers
accommodate later retirement, does
this lead to new types of employment
contracts? For example, if the incidence
of phased retirement increases,
then we might expect adjustments
in employment contracts that precommit workers to lower salaries
and/or benefits at older ages. Do
employers find it more efficient to
set up formal policies regarding
retirement transitions, such as phased
retirement options or return-towork postretirement? If so, are tax
policies and government-provided
retirement benefits designed optimally
to allow for new types of employment
relationships? What new types of
employment contracts are currently
being introduced to accommodate
trends toward working longer?
If working longer is deemed to be
beneficial for individuals, society, and
the economy, legislative policies could
be adopted to increase incentives for
individuals to remain in the labor
force and for firms to employ older
workers. Policymakers could identify
and remove any real or perceived age
discrimination issues associated with
phased retirement programs. This
would signal the benefit of modifying
working conditions and compensation
policies to ensure employing older
workers is cost-effective. Redesigned
jobs and reduced working hours,
combined with access to retirement
benefits when entering phased

retirement, could make employees
more willing to leave full-time
employment and accept these new
conditions.
Much of this analysis focuses on
the impact of delayed retirement on
individual employers, holding constant
market forces. In many aspects, this is
how a firm would view these changes.
However, demographic changes and
any ensuing macroeconomic shifts
will alter the labor market over time.
For example, downward pressure
on market wages will increase the
willingness of firms to accommodate
preferences for older retirement ages.
Extending Worklife outlines how
individual employers might view
sudden changes in the retirement ages
of their workforce. We emphasize how
the push toward delayed retirement
might not be desirable to individual
employers. We speculate that as
individuals choose to delay retirement,
firms will respond by trying to form
new types of employment contracts
more suited to the preferences of older
workers and consistent with their
changing value to firms.
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New Books from the Upjohn Press
Extending Work Life
Can Employers Adapt
When Employees Want
to Delay Retirement?

Robert Clark and Melinda Sandler Morrill
According to the authors of this WEfocus Series
book, “Many policy analysts, economists, and
demographers have argued that individuals must
extend their work lives if they are to achieve their
desired standard of
living in retirement.
Increases in longevity
imply that individuals
who leave the labor
force at traditional
retirement ages
must either save
more during their
working careers or
consume less during
their retirement. Reductions in the generosity of
employer- and government-funded retirement
programs exacerbate this problem. Thus, workers
today must save more than their predecessors to
achieve the same level of retirement well-being.
The idea seems clear—working longer and
retiring later is the only way future retirees can
sufficiently finance their retirement.”
While working longer may be necessary to
support more years in retirement, few studies
have examined this phenomenon from the
employer perspective. This book seeks to fill that
gap by providing a comprehensive assessment
of the costs and benefits to employers of
accommodating an increasing desire for delayed
or phased retirement.

WE
focus
series
88 pp. 2016
$14.99 paper 978-0-88099-528-3
PDF is available as a free download

How Did Employee
Ownership Firms
Weather the Last Two
Recessions?
Employee Ownership,
Employment Stability, and
Firm Survival: 1999–2011
Fidan Ana Kurtulus and Douglas L. Kruse
Employee ownership firms offer workers the
opportunity to own a stake in the firms where
they work. This
affords them the
ability to share in
profits and have a
voice in firm-related
decision making. In
this comprehensive
new book, Kurtulus
and Kruse provide
new evidence on
whether employee
ownership firms are better equipped to survive
recessions. In particular, they focus on broadbased employee ownership, which includes
ownership at all levels in the firm’s hierarchy.
The authors begin by defining employee
ownership, and then discuss the prevalence of
such firms in the United States. They also examine
how employee ownership affects employment
stability and why employee ownership firms have
survived recessions more successfully than other
firms.
Kurtulus and Kruse conclude by saying that the
benefits they observed in employee ownership
firms, particularly the greater employment
stability and survival rates, can help the overall
economy. Therefore, increased government
support to broaden employee ownership
programs is merited.
178 pp. 2016 / $18 paper 978-0-88099-525-2 /
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-526-9

Workers’Compensation:
Analysis for Its Second
Century
H. Allan Hunt and Marcus Dillender
Workers’ compensation (WC) is the original form
of social insurance as well as the first no-fault
insurance program. Under WC, workers receive
compensation
and treatment for
workplace injuries
and disease in
exchange for giving
up the right to sue
their employers for
negligence. Each
state and Canadian
province runs its own
WC program, and how
each is administered and the level of benefits
provided vary considerably. Therefore, assessing
best practices among these programs is tricky.
H. Allan Hunt and Marcus Dillender provide a
succinct analysis of the state of WC programs
in North America by focusing on three key
performance issues: 1) the adequacy of
compensation for those disabled in the
workplace, 2) return-to-work performance for
injured workers, and 3) prevention of disabling
injury and disease. Following a brief introductory
chapter that provides a discussion of the
difficulties of trying to compare so many diverse
programs, Hunt and Dillender devote a chapter
to each of the three performance issues and
provide empirical findings and useful guidance
for policymakers and researchers as they set
their sights on adapting WC for the twenty-first
century.

WE
focus
series
132 pp. 2017
$14.99 paper 978-0-88099-530-6
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/up_press/244/
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